x j or f(x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x n ) = M j2J x j :
Finally, we remark that our characterization of Boolean functions that are l n 2 m { private is valid even for functions de ned over in nite domains. The j n?1 2 k { private protocol of BGW], on the other hand, heavily relied on the niteness of the domains. We believe that for in nite domains, there exist functions that are not j n?1 2 k { private. Indeed, the secretsharing techniques used in that j n?1 2 k { private protocol, cannot be utilized in countable domains, as shown in CKss].
Given any x 1 2 A 1 , : : :, x n 2 A n , let J f1; : : : ; ng be the set of indices of the x i 's in C i , and M f1; : : :; ng its complement. Denote by`the size of J, and let k = n ?`. We will index the elements in J and M separately, that is (x 1 ; : : :; x n ) = (x j 1 ; x j 2 ; : : :; x m 1 ; : : :; x m k ; : : : ; x j`) : By (1) and (2) f(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) = f(x j 1 ; x j 2 ; : : : ; x m 1 ; : : :; x m k ; : : : ; x j`) = f(x j f 1 (x 1 ) f 2 (x 2 ) : : : f n (x n ) =`(mod 2) and thus f(x 1 ; x 2 ; : : :; x n ) = f 1 (x 1 ) f 2 (x 2 ) : : : f n (x n ) :
for eachx 2 n i=1 A i . We now turn to some implications of theorem 2. First we note that if f : A 1 A 2 : : : A n ! f0;1g has the form f(x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x n ) = f 1 (x 1 ) f 2 (x 2 ) : : : f n (x n ) then there is a very simple protocol Bh] for computing f n { privately. The i-th participant locally computes the bit y i 4 = f i (x i ). Then, it picks n ? 1 random independent bits y i;1 ; y i;2 ; : : : ; y i;n?1 , and y i;n such that y i = y i;1 y i;2 : : : y i;n holds. It sends y i;j to the j-th participant over their joint channel. After getting the n splits y 1;i ; y 2;i ; : : :; y n;i , the i-th participant adds them modulo 2 and sends the result z i 4 = y 1;i y 2;i : : : y n;i to every other participant. The sum modulo 2 of these n z i 's equals f(x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x n ). This protocol is (strongly) t-private for any 1 t n. Thus 
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Assume, by way of contradiction, the existence of b 2 B; c 2 C;x R 2 i2R A i ;x T 2 i2T A i ; x n 2 A n such that f(b;x R ;x T ; x n ) = f(c;x R ;x T ; x n ) :
By (3), we have g(b;x R ) h(x T ; x n ) = g(c;x R ) h(x T ; x n ) and thus g(b;x R ) = g(c;x R ) : Using (3) Thus for every b 2 B; b 2 B; c 2 C;x R 2 i2R A i ;x T 2 i2T A i ; x n 2 A n f(b;x R ;x T ; x n ) 6 = f(c;x R ;x T ; x n ) f( b;x R ;x T ; x n ) 6 = f(c;x R ;x T ; x n ) :
Again, since f is Boolean, these two inequalities imply f(b;x R ;x T ; x n ) = f( b;x R ;x T ; x n ) which completes the rst part of the proof. In the second part of the proof, we show that if for every i the set A i can be partitioned such that 1 and 2 hold, then the function f has the desired form. We begin the second part of the proof by xing an elementb i 2 B i for each i = 1; 2; : : : n. Without To simplify the exposition, the rst part is proven for i = 1, and the subscript is omitted from the two sets in the partition. We use the following notations Lemma 5: Let A 1 ; A 2 ; : : :; A n be non-empty sets, "; 0 satisfying " + < 1 2 , and f : A 1 A 2 : : : A n ! f0;1g be ; l n 2 m { privately computable with "{ error. Let S f1; 2; : : : ; ng be any subset of size l n 2 m . Denote by D (resp. E) the Cartesian product of the A i with i 2 S (resp. i 2 S). Then, viewing f as a two argument function f : D E ! f0;1g, f is {private with "{ error.
Proof: Given an n-party protocol for computing f : A 1 A 2 : : : A n ! f0;1g ; l n 2 m { privately with "{error, we convert it into a two party protocol for computing f : D E ! f0;1g. Denote the two parties by Q 1 and Q 2 . Q 1 simulates the role of the l n 2 m processors P i with i 2 S, using its source of random bits as l n 2 m independent sources of random bits. (Q 2 acts similarly with respect to S whose size is j n 2 k .) The messages exchanged between Q 1 and Q 2 in this two party protocol correspond to messages exchanged between S and S processors in the original multi party protocol. Using the de nitions, it is easy to see that this two party protocol computes f : D E ! f0;1g {privately with "{error.
We remark that to make use of the 
In the second part of the proof, we show how to derive the desired characterization of f from this property.
Proof: Assume to the contrary that there exist x 1 2 B and x 2 2 C such that f(x 1 ; x 2 ) = 0. Now, by the de nition of C, x 2 2 C ) 9y 1 2 B such that f(y 1 ; x 2 ) = 1. By the de nition of B, x 1 ; y 1 2 B ) f(x 1 ; ) = f(y 1 ; ) = 0. Since we have f(x 1 ; ) = f(y 1 ; ) = f(x 1 ; x 2 ) = 0, then according to Lemma 1 we must also have f(y 1 ; x 2 ) = 0 { contradiction.
Claim 3: 8x 1 2 B 8x 2 2 C : f(x 1 ; x 2 ) = 1 : Proof: Assume to the contrary that there exist x 1 2 B and x 2 2 C such that f(x 1 ; x 2 ) = 0. It follows from the de nition of B that x 2 6 = . Let y 1 be an arbitrary element of B (recall that B is not empty). Now, y 1 2 B ) f(y 1 ; ) = 0 and x 2 2 C ) f(y 1 ; x 2 ) = 0. Since we have f(y 1 ; ) = f(y 1 ; x 2 ) = f(x 1 ; x 2 ) = 0 then according to Lemma 1 we must also have f(x 1 ; ) = 0 { contradicting the fact that x 1 2 B. Claim 4: 8x 1 2 B 8x 2 2 C : f(x 1 ; x 2 ) = 0 : Proof: Assume to the contrary that there exist x 1 2 B and x 2 2 C such that f(x 1 ; x 2 ) = 1.
Recall that x 1 2 B implies f(x 1 ; ) = 1 and let y 1 be an arbitrary element of B i.e f(y 1 ; ) = 0. According to claim 2 f(y 1 ; x 2 ) = 1. Since we have f(x 1 ; x 2 ) = f(y 1 ; x 2 ) = f(x 1 ; ) = 1 then according to Lemma 1 we must also have f(y 1 ; ) = 1 { contradicting the fact that y 1 2 B.
We This completes the proof of theorem 1. One conclusion of theorem 1 is that in the two-party case, if f can be privately computed then it can be privately computed by a deterministic protocol. We emphasize that this does not hold for the multi-party case. A second conclusion is that in the two-party case whatever can be privately computed under the weak notion can also be privately computed under the strong notion. Thus (for any "; 0 such that " + < 1 2 ) these two notions are equivalent. As we will see in the next section, this conclusion holds in the multi-party case as well.
The Multi Party Case
In this section we prove the main result of our paper: A complete characterization of n? variable Boolean functions that are l n 2 m ? private. We start with a lemma that helps reduce the multi party case to the two party scenario. Using this lemma, we proceed to a detailed proof of the characterization theorem. Finally, we give some implications and corollaries. Throughout this section, we will say that a function f is weakly t{private if there are "; 0 satisfying " + < 1 2 , such that f can be computed ( ; t){privately with "{error. 8
other two summands is at most . Thus we have Proof: First, we present a private protocol for computing any function f of the form f(x 1 ; x 2 ) = f 1 (x 1 ) f 2 (x 2 ):
(1) P 1 computes f 1 (x 1 ) and sends its value (one bit) to P 2 .
(2) P 2 computes f 2 (x 2 ) and sends f(x 1 ; x 2 ) = f 1 (x 1 ) f 2 (x 2 ) (one bit) to P 1 . It is clear that P 1 does not learn any additional information since the only message it received during the protocol contains the function value, and P 2 does not learn any additional information since it can compute by itself (from the function value and its input) f 1 (x 1 ) = f(x 1 ; x 2 ) f 2 (x 2 ). The above protocol computes f with no errors and with strong privacy. In addition, this protocol is deterministic and the number of bits exchanged is exactly 2. Now, we assume that f can be computed { privately with " { error, and we show how to nd f 1 and f 2 as stated. Let be an arbitrary element of A 2 , and de ne the following sets: B 4 = fx 1 2 A 1 jf(x 1 ; ) = 0g C 4 = fx 2 2 A 2 j8x 1 2 B : f(x 1 ; x 2 ) = 0g
We assume, without loss of generality, that there exists some x 1 such that f(x 1 ; ) = 0 (that is, B is not empty). We will show now that the function is constant over each of the domains B C, B C, B C, B C:
Claim 1: 8x 1 2 B 8x 2 2 C : f(x 1 ; x 2 ) = 0 : Proof: This follows directly from the de nition of C. Claim 2: 8x 1 2 B 8x 2 2 C : f(x 1 ; x 2 ) = 1 : 7
Using these three lemmas, we can now prove Lemma 1.
Proof: (of Lemma 1 ).
Let F be a protocol that computes f { privately with " { error. Let S b be the set of all communication strings whose last message is b. Recall that on the rst three points, these strings correspond to executions computing the correct value of the function (which equals b). = fsjs 2 S b and Pr(sj(y 1 ; x 2 )) < Pr(sj(x 1 ; x 2 )) < Pr(sj(x 1 ; y 2 ))g
The protocol F has at most " { error for every input. Thus, to prove that f(y 1 ; y 2 ) = b, it su ces to show that on input (y 1 ; y 2 ), the probability of having a communication string whose last message is b (that is s 2 S b ), is greater than ":
